How Ferrari built the perfect trap to beat Mercedes at the Barcelona GP

Those tears held back on the podium say more than any words ever could about the weight of Lewis Hamilton’s first Ferrari victory. A triumph built, pursued, almost summoned, capable of sweeping away doubts while delivering the very answers the seven‑time world champion had been chasing after a complicated 2025.
More than 500 days after first walking through the gates of Maranello as a Ferrari driver, the dream of winning in the Prancing Horse race suit has finally become reality, turning the Barcelona GP into a date destined to go down in history. While the Virtual Safety Car arriving at just the right moment certainly helped, this triumph belongs above all to Hamilton and to Ferrari.
After the race, Toto Wolff did not hide his regrets because, from his perspective, the potential to win a race that for long stretches had seemed in Mercedes’ hands was genuinely there. But the reality must be read from two different angles: on one side, the regrets of the Silver Arrow; on the other, the perfectly orchestrated trap set by the Maranello engineers.
The first key choice was to start on the soft compound, a decision that opened up several scenarios. On one hand, the softer tyre offered that extra punch at the launch, potentially enough to challenge for the lead. On the other, it already built in the option of committing to an aggressive three‑stop strategy.
Pre‑race simulations indicated that, in normal conditions, the two‑stop and three‑stop strategies were evenly matched. The only truly critical variable was traffic: with a bunched‑up field, the risk was losing 7–8 seconds during overtaking. And this is where Mercedes made their first mistake, because in the opening stint they failed to widen the gap, leaving open the very window that would later complicate everything.
Looking at the lap times, Russell managed to stretch the margin just above three seconds during the first stint, enough to neutralise the undercut but not enough to guarantee real strategic flexibility. On the softs, Hamilton was inevitably the first to pit, triggering the sequence of stops and perhaps coming in a few laps earlier than the ideal window.
Lewis Hamilton, Ferrari
Photo by: Michael Potts / LAT Images via Getty Images
To avoid losing track position, Mercedes immediately chose to pit, and that decision began to derail the two‑stop plan outlined before the race. “I felt we pitted really early. You know, Lewis committed to a three stop. I think we should have committed to our own strategy, and it's something I want to pick up with the team,” Russell explained after the race, having started on the medium compound.
“I was managing quite a lot at the start and still eking that gap out to Lewis. And then I thought we actually converted to a three when they told me we were staying on the two. Yeah, that was a challenge.”
The tactical choices in the first stint
Looking at the lap times, Russell’s version of events is backed up by the data: towards the end of the first stint he still had some margin to push, especially through the high‑speed corners where he had been more cautious with the throttle to avoid stressing the tyres. Knowing he had to pit early to cover Hamilton, he could have taken a different approach to widen the gap ang gain a couple of seconds.
It might seem like a small amount, but those seconds made the difference between coming out ahead or behind when the Virtual Safety Car was deployed. That is exactly where the Ferrari 'trap' truly began to take shape: all the chasing cars anticipated their stops, moving themselves out of what would later become the ideal window for the two‑stop strategy.
This is a fundamental point because, looking at Russell’s progression during the second stint, it is clear that he suffered from a certain level of tyre degradation, to the point of allowing Kimi Antonelli to close in right behind him with a decidedly superior pace. But while Ferrari avoided this drop‑off phase by pitting for their second stop, it was a completely different story for Mercedes.
Hamilton recovered 19 seconds in eight laps
Short of switching to a three‑stop strategy like Ferrari did, covering at least one of their two drivers, Mercedes found itself in the uncomfortable position of having to extend the middle stint. This was necessary to recover the laps “lost” in the first stint and get back closer to the ideal window for the second stop. It was here that a double problem emerged: with his pace already dropping and understeer becoming increasingly pronounced, Russell began losing seconds, and his duel with Antonelli only worsened the situation.
Andrea Kimi Antonelli, Mercedes, Lewis Hamilton, Ferrari, George Russell, Mercedes
Photo by: Sam Bloxham / LAT Images via Getty Images
To better understand this, from the moment Hamilton completed his second pitstop to when Russell headed into the pits, the Ferrari driver recovered about 19 seconds in eight laps, an average of more than two seconds per lap. The internal battle between the two Mercedes drivers had a massive impact, and it was precisely during that phase that they effectively lost the race, leaving Ferrari the room to complete its strategic manoeuvre.
Two options were on the table: splitting the strategies, shifting Russell toward the three‑stop but needing to anticipate Ferrari because there was a concrete risk of being undercut by Hamilton, or swap positions and allow Antonelli, who had a decidedly better pace at that stage, to take the lead and attempt to counter Ferrari’s tactics. The choice not to interfere with the world championship battle by putting the two drivers on different strategies, or by resorting to team orders, is understandable, but played a key role.
“In the last two stints, towards the end, clearly Kimi had the advantage. And we didn't interfere in them fighting, because that's how we've always raced. But it's a situation we need to look into for the future, with both drivers, how to handle a situation where there's a pace differential. If we are fighting for a victory, at the risk of losing a victory. And that's going to be an interesting discussion. But always totally transparent to the best interest of the team.” Toto Wolff later explained.
| Lap | Hamilton’s time | Russell’s time | Pace Difference | Gap |
| 28 | HAM exits the pits | 1:23.176 | - | 23.399s |
| 29 | 1:20.633 | 1:23.208 | -2.575s | 20.824s |
| 30 | 1:20.910 | 1:23.647 | -2.737s | 18.087s |
| 31 | 1:20.725 | 1:23.325 | -2.600s | 15.487s |
| 32 | 1:20.855 | 1:22.884 | -2.029s | 13.458s |
| 33 | 1:21.077 | 1:23.437 | -2.360s | 11.098s |
| 34 | 1:20.954 | 1:22.649 | -1.695s | 9.403s |
| 35 | 1:21.151 | 1:22.921 | -1.770s | 7.633s |
| 36 | 1:21.227 | RUS pit stop | - | 4.854s |
| 37 | 1:20.979 | RUS exits the pits | - | 17.670s |
| 38 | 1:21.360 | 1:20.709 | +0.651s | 16.879s |
| 39 | 1:21.859 | 1:21.179 | +0.680s | 16.199s |
| 40 | 1:21.679 | 1:28.216 | VSC | - |
The championship battle became a bottleneck
These were the major mistakes by Mercedes that, over the course of just eight laps, nearly wiped out Hamilton’s additional pitstop. By doing so, Ferrari secured that narrow window of a few laps where, if the race were to be neutralised, the seven‑time world champion could make his final pitstop and still come out ahead of his compatriot. And that is exactly what happened, with the added benefit of fresher tyres to take him all the way to the chequered flag.
Talking about a scenario without a VSC, even assuming that Hamilton had stayed out for another six laps as planned and factoring in a degradation rate of about two tenths of a second per lap as predicted by Pirelli the comparison with the pace maintained by his rivals after their stops shows that Russell still would not have recovered a major portion of the lost seconds. He would have maintained a margin of just over 10 seconds, leaving himself exposed to Ferrari’s comeback.
Andrea Kimi Antonelli, Mercedes, George Russell, Mercedes
Photo by: Sam Bloxham / LAT Images via Getty Images
Mercedes’ only hope would have been to see Hamilton struggle to complete his overtakes on Norris, Antonelli and Russell. But there was also another element to keep in mind: how would Mercedes have handled a new, inevitable duel between its two drivers? Just as in the second stint, that situation would have repeated itself, and the only way out would have been to resort to team orders, something the team had chosen not to do precisely when it was needed most.
According to Ferrari’s data, Hamilton would have won the race anyway, even without the VSC, and in fact it was very likely considering the difference in race pace.
“We would have won the race, perhaps with a bit less. But we were also in a good situation with a fresh set of tyres at this stage. It was positive for us, but I don't want to do the calculation. What would have been in the race with this or this. But I think we were already in a very good situation”, Fred Vasseur explained after the race.
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